Utah Adoption Service for Women, a Utah non-profit corporation v. Bradley Thomas Belanger : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Utah Adoption Service for Women, a Utah non-
profit corporation v. Bradley Thomas Belanger :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James C. Haskins; Paul Gotay; Haskins and Associates; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellant.
Brian M. Barnard; Utah Legal Clinic; Attorney for Plaintiff.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah Adoption Service for Women v. Belanger, No. 890018 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1522
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 99-QQig 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPOSITED BY THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AUG171990 
UTAH ADOPTION SERVICE FOR 
WOMEN, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BRADLEY THOMAS BELANGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
IL-— 
Case No. 89-0018-CA 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY 
CLASSIFICATION 7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL DECISION OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, JUDGE PRESIDING. 
JAMES C. HASKINS USB # 1406 
PAUL GOTAY USB # 1224 
of and for HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Phone: (801) 268-3994 
8 &. 
t.' . 'J •••'•< ; ••:**» 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH ADOPTION SERVICE FOR 
WOMEN, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
BRADLEY THOMAS BELANGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 89-0018-CA 
: ARGUMENT PRIORITY 
CLASSIFICATION 7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL DECISION OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, JUDGE PRESIDING. 
JAMES C. HASKINS USB # 1406 
PAUL GOTAY USB # 1224 
of and for HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Phone: (801) 268-3994 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 2 
NATURE OF THE CASE 3 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 3 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 4 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 14 
ARGUMENT 16 
PART ONE 
I. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED 
UTAH LAW TO THE INSTANT CASE 16 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND DEFENDANT 
DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW, AND ALTERNATIVELY, 
DID NOT COMPLY WITH NEVADA LAW IN ESTABLISHING 
PATERNITY AND OBJECTING TO THE ADOPTION 21 
III. THE COURT DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT RIGHTS 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN EXTINGUISHING 
HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS 23 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE INTER-
STATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN DID 
NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASE 33 
i 
PART TWO 
V. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN NOT TAXING COSTS 36 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY DENIED TAXING 
COSTS 42 
CONCLUSION 44 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 45 
,• -? 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
page 
Buhler v. Maddison, 176 P.2d 118 (Utah 1947) 18 
Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988) 7 
Dunton v. Kibler, 518 F. Supp. 1146 
(N.D. Ga. 1981). 37 
Ellis v. Social Services Dept., Etc., 615 P.2d 1250 
(Utah 1980) 24, 25 
26, 28, 29, 30, 32 
Evans v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, 
514 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1975) 37 
First Security Bank v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563 
(Utah 1974)... 7.. 36 
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 
(Utah App. 1987) 7 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) 37 
38, 40, 41 
Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah App. 1987) 41 
Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984) 38, 40 
In re Adoption of Baby Boy C , 644 P.2d 150 
(Wash. App. 1982)............ 18 
In Re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 
(Utah 1986)....: 25, 26 
28, 29, 30, 32 
In re J.P. , 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) 19 
John Price Associates, Inc. v. Davis, 588 P.2d 713 
(Utah 1978) 41 
page 
Lawson Supply Co. v. General Plumbing & Heat., Inc., 
493 P. 2d 607 (Utah 1972) . . 38 
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) 20, 23 
31, 32 
Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way, 753 P.2d 507 
(Utah App. 1988) 40, 41 
43 
Matter of Appeal in Pima Cty., Etc., 575 P.2d 310 
(Ariz. 1978). 18 
Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 <Utah 1978) 38, 43 
Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977) 19 
Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753 
(Utah 1984) 24, 25 
26, 30 
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 761 P.2d 932 
(Utah App. 1988) 24, 30 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 23 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) 41 
Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc. of Ogden, 
364 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1961) 42 
Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 
(Utah 1984) 19, 20 
24, 26, 30, 31, 32 
iv 
STATUTES 
and RULES 
page 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-102 18 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.041-051 22 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
§ 62A-4-301 5, 17 
33, 35 
§ 75-2a-3 (2)(g) 2 
§ 78-30-4 5, 19 
21, 23, 24, 28 
Rule 4(a) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals 2 
Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 5 , 36 , 37 
Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 37 
TREATISES, RESTATEMENTS, ETC. 
20 Am. Jur.2d § 58 (1969) 40 
Scoles and Hay, Conflict of Laws 
(West Pub . iy»2) 17 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws 
§ 78 (1971) 16, 17, 18 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws 
§ 289 (1971) 17 
v 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH ADOPTION SERVICES FOR 
WOMEN, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
BRADLEY THOMAS BELANGER 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF 
OF UTAH ADOPTION 
SERVICES FOR WOMEN 
Case No. 89-0018-CA 
(Trial Court 
Civil No. C88-03292) 
THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, Utah Adoption Services For 
Women, by and through counsel of record, Brian M. Barnard of 
the Utah Legal Clinic, submits the following BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT and CROSS APPELLANT and seeks the affirmance of 
the decision of the trial court, the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Hon. Leonard H. 
Russon, judge presiding. 
The plaintiff also seeks reversal of the trial court's 
decision to deny court costs to the prevailing party, the 
plaintiff. 
i 
I 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 75-2a-3 (2)(g) (1953 as amended) and Rule 
4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals• 
II 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The trial court correctly applied Utah law to the 
instant case. 
The trial court correctly found that the defendant was 
required to and failed to satisfy the legal requirements of 
establishing paternity in Utah. 
The trial court correctly found that the defendant 
failed to satisfy the legal requirements of establishing 
paternity in Nevada. 
The trial court did not deprive defendant of rights 
without due process in terminating his parental rights after 
he failed to provide the proper notice of paternity as 
required by Utah law. 
The trial court correctly found that the Interstate 
Compact on placement of children was not applicable to this 
matter and that plaintiff did not violate said compact. 
9 
The trial court erred in declining to tax costs against 
defendant and in not providing any reasons for this 
decision. 
Ill 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff adoption agency sought a declaratory 
judgment that temporary custody of the child born to "D.R.F" 
and defendant was properly in the plaintiff, and sought an 
order allowing the adoption of the child to proceed. The 
trial court granted to plaintiff the relief sought but 
failed to tax costs to the prevailing party. 
IV 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court applied Utah law to determine the 
validity of the consents to the adoption and the adoption 
itself. The trial court found the consent of the natural 
father invalid under Utah law, but determined that the 
father relinquished any rights to the child when he failed 
to register with the Utah Department of Vital Statistics. 
The court imposed the Utah requirement on this 
non-resident because in this case: (1) the father knew that 
the baby would be put up for adoption in Utah at least two 
(2) months prior to the birth of the baby; (2) the father 
had access to legal counsel if he wanted to protect his 
rights to the child by objecting to the adoption prior to 
its occurrence; and, (3) the father failed to establish 
paternity even in his home state of Nevada prior to the 
adoption. 
Because defendant failed to act to protect his rights 
to the child until well after the baby was born and placed 
for adoption, the court terminated the limited rights of the 
natural father. 
Although the lower court found the consent signed by 
defendant in Nevada was invalid, the consent and its signing 
are useful in ascertaining the natural father's true intent 
as to his alleged "disapproval11 of the adoption proceedings. 
The lower court also found that the Interstate Compact 
on Placement of Children did not have application in this 
case, and also rejected defendant's claim for damages as a 
result of alleged unprofessional or unethical conduct by 
plaintiff. 
The trial court denied plaintiff's court costs without 
reason. 
V 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The decision of the trial court finding a termination 
of the parental rights of the defendant should be affirmed. 
The decision of the trial court refusing, without 
explanation, to award court costs to the plaintiff should be 
reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff for the costs incurred, 
VI 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Consent to adoption -- Paternity Claims 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (1953 as amended) 
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-4-301 et. seq. (1953 as amended) 
Award of Court Costs 
Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
VII 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendant executed a consent in Nevada giving up 
all legal rights to a child born in Nevada to "D.R.F." and 
immediately thereafter, the child was delivered to Utah and 
placed with the plaintiff adoption agency by ffD.R.F.ff 
Several days later, the defendant demanded possession of the 
child and this action was commenced by the adoption agency 
to determine the validity of the consent from the defendant, 
to secure custody of the child, to terminate defendant's 
parental rights and to allow the plaintiff agency to proceed 
with the adoption of the child. 
The defendant countersued for damages alleging improper 
and unethical conduct on the part of the plaintiff agency, 
and seeking delivery of the child to him. 
After an expedited bench trial, the counterclaim was 
dismissed as no cause of action, and the court determined on 
the complaint that the defendant's parental rights had been 
terminated by his failure to comply with the Utah child 
acknowledgement statutes, although his consent signed in 
Nevada did not comply with Utah law or Nevada law. The 
trial court's decision authorized the plaintiff to move 
forward with the adoption proceeding. 
The defendant appeals the decision terminating his 
parental rights and allowing the adoption to move ahead. 
The plaintiff cross-appeals the denial of an award of court 
costs by the court. During the pendency of the appeal, the 
adoption proceeding has been stayed and the child remains in 
the adoptive home in Utah. 
fi 
VIII 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant does not contest the Findings of Fact 
made by the Trial Court, but makes a couple weak 
suggestions that the certain Findings were wrong. A review 
of Findings by this Court on appeal requires a marshalling 
of the evidence, and any alteration of Findings by this 
Court would require a showing that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the Findings and thus, that the 
Findings were clearly erroneous. Cornish Town v. Roller, 
758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 
P.2d 301 (Utah App. 1987). The defendant has not begun to 
meet his burden, and the Findings of Fact of the trial court 
must stand. 
The following facts are taken from the Findings of Fact 
entered by the court after trial; the citations are to the 
same numbered paragraphs of those findings. 
1. Defendant Belanger is the father of a male child 
born on April 25, 1988 in Nevada. 
2. "D.R.F.", the mother of the child, is not a party 
to this action. She relinquished all rights to her minor 
child and released the child to the plaintiff, Utah Adoption 
Service for Women. The child subsequently has been placed 
in an adoptive home in Utah. 
3. The defendant claims his rights to the child. 
7. Defendant and D.R.F. lived together in Nevada from 
May to September 1987 during which time D.R.F. conceived a 
child by defendant. They were never married. In late 
September, D.R.F. moved and no longer resided with the 
defendant. She and her sister moved to Salt Lake City, Utah 
to live. 
8. D.R.F. told defendant of her pregnancy by phone 
during the first week of October, 1987, and indicated that 
she was considering placing the child for adoption in Utah. 
When D.R.F. told defendant about the pregnancy and the 
adoption plan, she understood he was not happy with her 
decision but she felt he agreed to go along with it. 
9. In October 1987, while living with her sister in 
Utah, D.R.F. contacted plaintiff, to discuss the adoption of 
the expected child. 
11. From October 1987 to January 1988, D.R.F. and 
defendant had numerous discussions concerning placing the 
child for adoption. Defendant indicated that he was not in 
favor of doing so. D.R.F. consistently said that she was 
leaning towards placing the child for adoption and defendant 
was saying he didn't want to place the child. 
12. In March, 1988 D.R.F. telephoned defendant to 
again inform him of her plan for placing the child for 
adoption in Utah, and asking him to meet her and a 
representative of the plaintiff adoption agency, Dr. Sandra 
Bagley, to discuss possible adoptive families and 
defendant's medical history. Defendant agreed to be 
present. In attending that meeting, defendant said that he 
would support D.R.F. emotionally, in the hopes that she 
would change her mind and not place the child for adoption. 
13. On April 9, 1988, a meeting took place in Ontario, 
California. D.R.F., defendant and Dr. Bagley were present. 
Defendant's medical history was discussed, as well as 
potential adoptive families. Defendant, at D.R.F.'s 
request, took notes on the various families. Defendant and 
D.R.F. both participated in the discussion about families. 
Bagley talked to defendant concerning a consent form 
regarding the adoption that would eventually have to be 
signed, and they reviewed it in part. At some time during 
the review of the form, defendant said, "I don't want to put 
the child up for adoption." Dr. Bagley considered this not 
unusual since most natural parents do not want to place 
their children for adoption. She considered this a natural 
reaction. Defendant never said that he refused to place the 
child for adoption. Bagley explained the adoption procedure 
to defendant during that meeting and told him that Utah law 
would apply to the adoption. Dr. Bagley left the consent 
form with defendant. He was not asked to sign papers at 
that time, since the child was not yet born. Bagley left 
with him a business card and he understood that if he had 
questions he could get in touch with her. 
14. D.R.F. planned to give birth to her child in the 
state of Utah, and to then place the child with the plain-
tiff agency. She wanted the baby to be born in Utah instead 
of California, where she was then residing, so she would not 
have to hand-deliver the baby to Utah. 
15. Defendant knew that D.R.F. was planning to place 
her child for adoption with the plaintiff adoption agency in 
Utah, and he knew that D.R.F. was planning to deliver the 
baby at a hospital in Utah, and he had discussed the pos-
sibility of his being present in Utah during the birth of 
the baby with Sandra Bagley. 
16. As the expected delivery date drew near, flight 
arrangements were made by the plaintiff for D.R.F. to fly to 
Utah for the purpose of delivering and relinquishing the 
baby for adoption. She left Ontario, California, on April 
20, 1988 to go to Utah and stopped in Nevada to visit her 
family for a few days. While in Las Vegas, she entered into 
premature labor and delivered the baby on April 25, 1988. 
18. Defendant visited D.R.F. in the hospital. Again, 
adoption was discussed. D.R.F. and defendant agreed between 
them that defendant would later sign the consent giving the 
child for adoption, if D.R.F. would then have his name 
placed on the birth certificate. 
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19. Upon release from the hospital on'April 26, 1988, 
D.R.F., with her new infant, checked into a local motel 
along with the Defendant. During that evening, with 
defendant present, Dr. Bagley called D.R.F. on the phone to 
discuss travel arrangements. She was told by D.R.F. that 
defendant's name was on the birth certificate. Bagley 
informed D.R.F. that defendant then needed to sign the 
consent form she had left with him. The forms could not be 
found. Because D.R.F. was to fly out the next morning for 
Salt Lake City, Utah, Bagley dictated by phone to D.R.F. a 
consent to be signed by defendant. As dictated D.R.F. wrote 
the consent on the back of an envelope, and thereafter 
rewrote it on a sheet of paper in her own hand. Defendant 
knew at this time that D.R.F. was going to fly the next 
morning to Utah, with the baby, and was going to place the 
child for adoption with the plaintiff agency in Utah. 
20. For unknown reasons, defendantfs name was not 
placed on the birth certificate. 
21. The following morning, April 27, 1988, D.R.F.fs 
mother arrived at the motel, along with D.R.F.fs sisterfs 
boyfriend, a notary public, Dennis Brough. D.R.F. told 
defendant he had to sign the consent since he had agreed to 
if his name was placed on the birth certificate, and he had 
to do so quickly so she could make her flight to Utah. The 
notary public said nothing to him, nor did the notary place 
him under oath or require him to acknowledge his signature. 
Defendant read the consent, and in front of the notary 
signed the same, and dated it. Defendant had no questions 
about it or about what it said when he signed it. The 
notary then notarized the consent, and left it with D.R.F. 
The consent form was signed on April 27, 1988, and notarized 
that date, although defendant had misdated it April 28, 
1988. 
22. The consent form signed by defendant reads in 
pertinent part as follows: 
I, Bradley Thomas Belanger, release and 
waive my parental rights to the male child 
born on the 25th day of April, 1988, to the 
natural mother [D.R.F.] at . . . Nevada. I 
give my consent for this child to be placed 
in the adoptive home selected by his natural 
mother. 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 28th 
[sic] day of April, 1988. 
The form was signed by Dennis R. Brough as a notary, and he 
affixed his notary seal. Later on that day, April 27th, 
D.R.F. delivered the consent to Dr. Bagley in Utah. 
23. D.R.F. signed a valid Release of Custody and 
Consent to Adoption on April 27, 1988 in Utah. 
24. The evening of April 27, 1988, defendant in a 
telephone conversation with D.R.F. she confirmed that she 
had executed the Release and placed the child for adoption. 
Defendant said he was going to resist the adoption. 
25. Several days later, defendant was contacted by the 
welfare department of Clark County, Nevada, who informed him 
that they had received additional consent forms from the 
plaintiff that required his signature. He went to the 
welfare department and informed them of his feelings and was 
advised to obtain a lawyer. He subsequently went to his 
lawyer who had represent him in other matters over an 
extended period of time. 
26. Defendant was informed on Tuesday, May 3, 1988 by 
his lawyer that Nevada law required him to file an affidavit 
at the hospital to be on the birth certificate, and if not, 
to file an affidavit with the Nevada Department of Vital 
Statistics acknowledging paternity of the child. He filed 
an affidavit with the State more than a week after the birth 
and two months later he received a birth certificate with 
his name on it. 
27. The child was placed in an adoptive home in Utah 
on April 27, 1988, and still resides there awaiting 
finalization of the adoption. 
i Q 
28. The plaintiff is a non-profit Utah corporation and 
Utah licensed adoption agency, and Dr. Sandra Bagley is its 
director. 
IX 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The trial court properly found that Utah law applied in 
the instant case. The child was given up for adoption in 
Utah and the adoption will take place in Utah. The child 
and adoptive parents currently reside in Utah. 
Although Nevada law does not apply, it would not make 
any difference to defendant if it did. The two state's laws 
do not conflict. Both would result in terminating 
defendant's parental rights. 
Point II 
The trial court correctly found that defendant failed 
to comply with Utah law and Nevada law. 
Defendant needed to comply with Utah law to assert his 
parental rights. He failed to do so. Defendant also failed 
to comply with Nevada law before the adoption took place. 
The trial court did not err, then, in terminating 
defendant's parental rights. 
1U 
Point III 
The trial court, in applying the parental right 
termination statute, did not deprive defendant of a right 
without due process because defendant does not fit the 
impossibility exception to the Utah statute. 
Point V 
The trial court correctly found the Interstate Compact 
on Placement of Children did not apply because the mother 
delivered the baby over in Utah. 
Point V 
The trial court abused its discretion in not taxing 
costs against defendant. 
Point VI 
The trial court was arbitrary in not providing any 
reasons for its decision not to tax costs. 
i * 
X 
ARGUMENT 
PART ONE 
I. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED UTAH LAW TO THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
The trial court in its memorandum decision found, and 
the defendant does not dispute that: The infant in question 
is the subject of a Petition for Adoption filed in the state 
of Utah. The petitioners in the adoption proceeding are 
residents of the state of Utah, the baby was relinquished by 
the natural mother in Utah to a licensed adoption agency, 
and the child is presently in the home of the adoptive 
parents in Utah awaiting further action on the petition. A 
consent of the natural father was made in the state of 
Nevada, and hand-delivered by the natural mother to the 
adoption agency in Utah along with the child. Whether the 
adoption is valid and whether the termination of the 
defendant's rights is valid must be determined by Utah law. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 78 (1971) 
states: 
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdic-
tion to grant an adoption if: 
(a) it is the state of domicile of either the 
adopted child or the adoptive parent, and 
(b) the adoptive parent and either the adopted 
child or the person having legal custody of the 
child are subject to its personal jurisdiction. 
In addition, Comment (d) of § 78 of the Restatement 
states: "In determining whether an adoption should be 
granted, courts in this country apply their own local law 
and not the law of some other state." Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws § 289 (1971); Scoles and Hay, Conflict 
of Laws 541-42 (West Pub. 1982). 
Although the trial court found that the Interstate 
Compact on Placement of Children did not apply, the 
provisions of that statute do provide some guidance. 
Section 62A-4-301 of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
provides in subsection (1) of Article III that when a child 
is brought form one state into another for the purpose of 
adoption, "the applicable laws of the receiving state" 
govern the agency's action. 
Similarly, Scoles, Conflict of Laws notes the 
appropriate locale for adoption proceedings is where the 
child is domiciled. 
Adoption at the domicile of the child, through 
voluntary acts of the adopting parents performed there, 
has been held valid both in the state of adoption and 
elsewhere, even where the adoptive parents had no 
domicile within the state. Decisions denying jurisdic-
tion to adopt upon these facts seem to be based upon 
interpretation of a particular statute, rather than 
upon any general principle of jurisdiction. 
Id. at 542 (citations omitted). 
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In In re Adoption of Baby Boy C., 644 P.2d 150, 153 
(Wash. App. 1982) the Washington Court of Appeals upheld the 
trial court's determination that it had jxiris diet ion over an 
adoption proceeding "because the adoptive parents [were] 
domicilliaries of Washington." In reaching its decision, 
the court cited Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 78, 
and noted that ff[t]he Restatement position has been increas-
ingly accepted by other jurisdictions.11 Id. at 153 (cita-
tions omitted) . 
In Matter of Appeal in Pima Cty., Etc., 575 P.2d 310 
(Ariz. 1978) the Arizona Supreme Court held that it had 
jurisdiction to conduct adoption proceedings in the case of 
three children brought from Texas. Pursuant to Arizona 
Revised Statutes Annotated § 8-102, which grants Arizona 
courts jurisdiction in adoption proceedings when a child is 
present within that state, the court held that it could 
properly exercise jurisdiction where the children were 
brought from Texas with their natural mother's consent, and 
with the approval of Texas authorities. Id. at 314. 
The proper choice of law, the defendant contends, is 
Nevada. Defendant relies on Buhler v. Maddison, 176 P.2d 
118 (Utah 1947) to support this contention. In Buhler, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that Nevada law applies to matters 
of substantive law and the court will use Nevada law in 
deciding what is substantive and procedural when a Utah 
worker is injured in Nevada. However, this action is not a 
workmen's compensation case and the injury (or cause of 
action) did not arise in a sister state (Nevada). The 
mother placed the child for adoption in Utah. The adoption 
will occur in Utah. The defendant, then, needed to assert 
his rights in Utah. The failure to assert those rights, or 
the cause of this action, arose in Utah. Defendant cannot 
assert his parental rights by filing a notice of paternity 
in Nevada after the adoption has occurred in Utah. (This 
requirement may be unfairly applied to a defendant, see 
infra part 111, but does not change which law to apply.) 
Defendant may be correct in noting that certain "par-
ental rights" arose in Nevada (Appellant's Brief, p. 27) 
simply because of the birth of the child, but these 
"parental rights" were not entitled to constitutional 
protection until the defendant took some substantial step 
toward securing that right. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 
(Utah 1982); see also Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 
(1977); Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3)(a) (1953 as amended) 
(where father must file with registrar of vital statistics 
and be willing to support the child). "Although parental 
rights have their origin in biological relationships, those 
relationships do not guarantee the permanency of parental 
rights." Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 
199, 202 (Utah 1984). "[T]he mere existence of a biological 
link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection." 
Id. at 203 (1984); citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 
(1983). 
Defendant's parental right did not arise to a legally 
cognizable level until he took some affirmative step to 
establish that right. Signing a consent form to an 
adoption, letting the mother give the child up for adoption 
in Utah and not filing a claim of paternity with the Utah 
Bureau of Vital Statistics (or indeed taking any action for 
over six (6) days) does not evince a father who has 
"fulfilled a parental role" but one whose relationship to 
his child is "very attenuated" at best. Wells at 203. 
In any event, defendants parental right is not the 
cause of this action. It is the termination of those 
rights, which occurred in Utah, which is the cause of this 
action. If this case dealt with denial of a paternity 
acknowledgement, which defendant did receive, then Nevada 
law would be controlling. This action is concerned, howev-
er, with the validity of an adoption proceeding. The 
proceeding occurred in Utah and therefore Utah law applies. 
While there is no case law directly on point, in light 
of the foregoing provisions and cases, Utah law was properly 
applied in the instant case. 
Defendant herein alleges that there is a conflict 
between Utah and Nevada law, and that Nevada law should 
?n 
govern. Assuming, arguendo, that Nevada law does apply, 
based on the facts of this case and the applicable Nevada 
law, the result would be the same. Defendant failed to 
comply with either state's laws before the adoption 
occurred. He would not be entitled to the relief he 
requests under either state's law. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND DEFENDANT DID NOT 
COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW, AND ALTERNATIVELY, DID NOT COMPLY WITH 
NEVADA LAW IN ESTABLISHING PATERNITY AM) OBJECTING TO THE 
ADOPTION. 
Since Utah law governs, the Utah statutes regarding 
adoptions must be followed for adoptions to occur. The 
trial court did not err in finding that the adoption could 
proceed and that any and all rights of the natural parents 
were terminated. Defendant never registered with the Utah 
Registrar of Vital Statistics. 
A person who is the father or claims to be the father 
of an illegitimate child may claim rights pertaining to his 
child by filing with the registrar of vital statistics in 
the department of health, a notice of his claim of paternity 
of an illegitimate child and of his willingness and intent 
to support the child to the best of his ability. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4(3)(a) (1953 as amended). 
Defendant clearly did not comply with these terms. 
Defendant had sufficient opportunity to do so and has not 
yet done so. The trial court, then, was correct in finding 
that defendant did not comply with Utah law. 
Additionally, the trial court was correct in finding 
that defendant did not comply with the requirements of 
establishing paternity in Nevada. 
[A man] may establish his paternity where (1) he and 
the mother have been married during a certain period, 
or (2) the father and the natural mother were co-habit-
ing for at least six (6) months before the period of 
conception and continued to co-habit through the period 
of conception, or, (3) he receives the child into his 
own home and openly holds it out as his natural child, 
or (4) he and the mother attempted to marry before the 
birth, or (5) at any time he acknowledges or admits his 
paternity of the child in a writing filed with the 
State Registrar of Vital Statistics. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 126.041-051. 
Defendant did not satisfy any of these requirements prior to 
the time the child was placed for adoption. 
Defendant is correct in noting that the Nevada statute 
literally allows paternity to be established "at any time,11 
yet this only applies to establishing paternity. To be 
applied to prevent an adoption proceeding, the defendant 
must establish paternity before the baby is placed for 
adoption. The defendant's interpretation of "at any time" 
would mean that he could acknowledge the child as his a year 
or two after its birth and that he could then set aside or 
reopen an adoption that occurred shortly after the birth; 
this is not a reasonable interpretation and could not be 
what the Nevada Legislature had in mind when it enacted the 
statute. 
Because the defendant did not satisfy the Nevada 
statute by acknowledging or admitting paternity prior to the 
adoption, (or under any other Nevada provision) and because 
defendant did not even attempt to meet the requirements of 
the Utah statute, the trial court was correct in finding 
defendant had relinquished any and all rights to the child. 
If a parent is truly interested in securing the rights of 
his or her illegitimate child, the law gives such an inter-
ested parent adequate opportunity to do so. Based on the 
facts of this case, the "interested11 parent had more than 
ample opportunity to assert his rights. He failed to do so 
and his parental rights were accordingly terminated. 
III. THE COURT DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN 
EXTINGUISHING HIS PARENTAL RIGHTST 
To protect the limited constitutional rights of fathers 
of illegitimate children in adoption proceedings (as 
required by the United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248 (1983)), the Utah Legislature enacted Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-30-4 (1953 as amended). This 
statute has endured consistent equal protection and due 
process constitutional attack. Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. 
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social 
Services, 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984); Swayne v. L.D.S. Social 
Services, 761 P.2d 932 (Utah App. 1988). It has endured 
because it is a fair balancing of the interests of the state 
in securing quick and efficient placement of adopted 
children and the limited rights of fathers of illegitimate 
children to object to the proceedings. Ellis v. Social 
Services Dept., Etc. 615 P.2d 1250, 1255; Wells at 202-203, 
207; Swayne at 937-42. ffThe state must . . . have legal 
means to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether 
the biological parents (or either of them) are going to 
assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their 
corresponding responsibilities, or whether adoptive parents 
must be substituted." Wells, at 203. 
Although, Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4 (1953 as 
amended) is constitutional on its face, it may not be 
constitutional when applied. Ellis at 1256. Particular 
circumstances may arise where the statute might unfairly 
deny the parent's rights. The filing requirement with the 
Utah Bureau of Vital Statistics may not be appropriate in 
some circumstances. In such cases, the statute unconsti-
tutionally is applied to a particular parent and the 
adoption cannot continue without some hearing to resolve the 
parent's interest. See Ellis at 1256; In Re Adoption of 
Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant contends that the statute is unconsti-
tutional as applied to him. Specifically, defendant 
contends that this statute should not require an out of 
state parent to register with the Bureau of Vital Statis-
tics. The Utah Supreme Court, in recognizing that some 
circumstances do not require registration with the Utah 
Bureau prior to the adoption, carved out an exception in 
individual cases. This exception, known as the "impossibil-
ity" exception, applies "when it is impossible for the 
father to file the required notice for paternity prior to 
the statutory bar, through no fault of his own." Ellis at 
1256. 
The Utah courts in determining whether the statute is 
constitutionally applied, look at particular circumstances 
of each parent and stress that general rules should not be 
taken from these individual holdings. Sanchez at 755 n.l. 
However, basic "themes11 run throughout these cases. These 
are: 
(1) whether the affected parent knew that an adoption 
was about to take place. See Baby Boy Doe at 690; Ellis at 
1256. 
(2) whether the affected parent knew when and where 
the adoption was going to take place; Ellis at 1256 n. 16; 
Baby Boy Doe at 691, 
(3) whether the affected parent had a reasonable 
amount of time to file to avoid the statutory bar; Baby Boy 
Doe at 691; Sanchez at 755 (where one day was adequate 
amount of time); Wells at 207. 
In the instant case, defendant knew that an adoption 
was about to take place. Although defendant alleges he 
really did not know the adoption would take place until it 
happened and that he was always trying to dissuade the 
mother, this is not truel The mother and defendant father 
met with the adoption agency in April, 1988, the mother 
consistently maintained that the baby was going to be put up 
for adoption, she told the defendant prior to the adoption 
that she was going to Utah to give the child up. In light 
of these facts, defendant's contentions were found untrue by 
the trial court. 
This court should not adopt defendant's position in 
this case. It would be difficult for any biological father 
to receive any greater notice of the adoption than defendant 
received. Defendant's position creates a special notice 
requirement to the individual parent, which the Utah Supreme 
Court has previously rejected (Wells at 208) , and creates a 
great cloud of uncertainty over adoption proceedings. 
Defendant does not dispute that he knew when and where 
and with what agency the child would be placed for adoption. 
The trial court specifically found that he knew that 
information! The specific and unchallenged Findings of Fact 
recite: 
13. On April 9, 1987 [sic - 1988], a meeting took 
place in a restaurant in Ontario, California. D.R.F., 
Belanger and Dr. Bagley were present. . . . Bagley 
explained the adoption procedure to Belanger during 
that meeting and [she] told him that Utah law would 
apply to the adoption. . . . 
k k *k 
15. Beginning in October 1987, Belanger knew that 
D.R.F. was planning to place her child for adoption 
with the plaintiff adoption agency in Utah, and he knew 
that D.R.F. was planning to deliver the baby at a 
hospital in Utah, and he had discussed with Sandra 
Bagley the possibility of his being present in Utah 
during the birth of the baby. 
16. From the April 9, 1988 meeting until the birth of 
the child, Belanger and D.R.F. communicated about twice 
a week. During those conversations D.R.F. continued to 
say that she was included to place the child for 
adoption in Utah. . . . 
17. After the birth of the child, while D.R.F. was in 
the hospital, Belanger visited her. Again, adoption 
was discussed. About noon on April 25 when [sic] 
D.R.F. told Belanger that she felt obligated to go 
through with her earlier decision to place the child 
for adoption through the plaintiff. . . . 
k k k 
19. . . . Belanger knew at this time [evening of April 
26, 1988] that D.R.F. was going to fly the next morning 
to Utah, with the baby, and was going to place the 
child for adoption with the plaintiff agency in Utah. 
k k k 
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29. Under the facts of this case, with the clear 
knowledge of Belanger that the child was to be born in 
Utah, to be placed for adoption with the plaintiff in 
Utah, the defendant literally had months in which to so 
register with the Utah Bureau of Vital Statistics since 
such registration may occur prior to the birth of a 
child in Utah. And, during this time, plaintiff [sic -
defendant] had legal counsel in other matters and could 
have and should have protected his rights because of 
the notice and knowledge that he had in this matter. 
Belanger did not exercise his rights in the state of 
Nevada for the establishment of his paternity as 
required by Nevada statutes. . . . and he did not 
timely acknowledged [sic] or admitted [sic] his 
paternity in writing filed with the Nevada State 
Registrar of Vital Statistics as required. 
Defendant had adequate time to file with the Utah 
Bureau. Defendant knew beginning in October, 1987 that the 
child would be placed up for adoption, and knew beginning in 
January, 1988 that the child would be place in Utah through 
the plaintiff agency. 
Defendant, in claiming he did not have time to comply 
with the statxite, asks the court to impose an unreasonable 
time allowance/burden on adoption proceedings for fathers of 
illegitimate children to assert their rights. 
Finally, defendant argues that the statutory require-
ment unfairly applies to him because he did not know of the 
Utah requirement as a Nevada resident. Defendant uses Ellis 
and In Re Baby Boy Doe to support his position. In these 
cases, the court found a denial of procedural due process 
and an exception to the requirement of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-30-4 (1953 as amended) in light of the father's 
out-of-state status. But the out-of-state status was not 
the sole basis for the courts1 rulings. It was only one of 
the factors in a larger situation. In Ellis, in addition to 
be an California resident, the father also had no idea where 
the mother had gone and no idea that the mother would place 
the child up for adoption. She gave birth to the child in 
Utah and placed it for adoption four days later. Shortly 
thereafter, the father learned of the birth and the actions 
of the child's mother. Less than two weeks later, after the 
Christmas and New Year holidays, the father filed with the 
Utah Bureau a notice of his claim. 
The defendant in the instant case knew when and where 
and thfough what agency the adoption would take place. The 
defendant could have literally walked to Utah to file his 
claim with the Bureau and secure his rights. It is not 
unconstitutional to terminate an out-of-state parent's 
rights when he had adequate notice and only choose to assert 
those rights after the adoption has taken place. 
In In Re Adoption of Baby Doe, the father did not even 
know the mother was going to place the child up for 
adoption. In addition, the baby was born early in Utah 
(while the father was traveling from California to Arizona) 
without the biological fatherfs knowledge. The father did 
not learn of the birth until three (3) days after the child 
was born and one day after the adoption proceeding. The 
father did not know of his need to protect his rights, nor 
did he know when and where he needed to protect them. 
Defendant herein knew or should have known of the need to 
protect his rights and he knew when and where he needed to 
protect them. 
Since it was possible for the defendant to comply with 
the statutory requirement, and defendant did not comply only 
through his own fault, the statute does not 
unconstitutitionally apply to defendant. 
Defendant alleges that because he did not know of the 
Utah statutory requirement, he did not have a "reasonable 
opportunityM to comply with it. However, since the 
defendant does not qualify under the impossibility exception 
to the statute, defendant may not show "he was not afforded 
a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute.ff Wells 
at 208. In addition, the defendant has never come forward 
to comply with the Utah statute. See Swayne at 940. 
Assuming, arguendo, the impossibility exception does 
apply, defendant was provided "reasonably opportunity11 to 
comply with the statute. 
Defendant knew or should of known of the requirement of 
filing with the Utah Bureau of Vital Statistics. The court 
will imply or assume knowledge of the statutory requirement 
when the facts of the case dictate. Sanchez at 755; In Re 
the Adoption of Baby Doe at 691; Ellis at L256. Given 
defendant's knowledge of when and where the adoption would 
take place and the adoption agency involved, his age (28 
years), his access to legal counsel, (he had counsel in a 
pending bankruptcy proceeding, who filed the initial action 
to contest the adoption in Nevada), his reasonable 
intelligence and ability to operate a business, the court 
must assume knowledge on the defendant's part. One cannot 
believe that defendant could have thought he protected his 
rights by filing a claim of paternity in Nevada after the 
adoption had taken place in Utah, and after he had been told 
that Utah law would apply. The burden in all reported cases 
is on the asserting parent to find out about filing or 
registration requirement. The defendant could have found 
out about the requirement through a simple phone call to the 
appropriate Utah authorities. Wells at 202. 
Defendant had been specifically told the adoption would 
take place in Utah and that Utah law would apply. Defen-
dant's argument is, in effect, that he should have received 
special notice of Utah law and the need for him to register 
paternity in Utah. This was expressly rejected in Wells at 
207. The Utah Supreme Court, citing Lehr v. Robertson, 
rejected this argument and quoting from Lehr states: 
This argument amounts to nothing more than an indirect 
attack on the notice provisions of the . . . statute. 
The legitimate state interests in facilitating the 
adoption of young children and having the adoption 
proceeding completed expeditiously that underlie the 
entire statutory scheme also justify a trial judge*s 
determination to require all interested parties to 
acihere precisely to the procedural requirements oT the 
statute " ". ". Since the New York statutes adequately 
protected appellant's inchoate interest in establishing 
a relationship with Jessica, we find no merit in the 
claim that his constitutional rights were offended 
Fecause the family court strictly complied with the 
provisions of the statute. 
Wells at 208 (citing Lehr at 265) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the Utah trial court did not deny defendant his 
constitutional rights. 
The statute has been constitutionally applied to the 
defendant. The impossibility exception does not apply. By 
mail, car, plane or foot, defendant could have registered 
with the Bureau of Vital Statistics. The defendant also had 
notice of the State statute. Defendant, knowing that the 
adoption was going to take place in Utah, had access to 
legal counsel, access to plaintiff, access to the mother, 
access to any Utah governmental agency, he could have 
complied with the statute. Defendant should not be able to 
exchange his "out-of-state11 status for his failure to assert 
his parental rights. It is mere fortuity that defendant 
shares the same out-of-state status as the fathers in Ellis 
and Baby Boy Doe. Fortuity should not be the foundation for 
a due process violation. 
Therefore, the Utah requirement does not unconstitu-
tionally burden defendant's rights and the trial court did 
not deny him due process in terminating those rights. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE INTERSTATE COMPACT 
ON PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN DID NOT APPLY TO THE INSTANT CASE. 
The court correctly found the Interstate Compact on 
Placement of Children had no application in this case. The 
plaintiff was not a "sending agency" as defined in the 
Interstate Compact, Article III, § 62A-4-301 (Utah Code 
Annotated (1988 Supp.). The mother herself brought the baby 
into Utah (she had planned to give birth to the child in 
Utah and only premature delivery prevented her) and placed 
it with the adoption agency and signed her consent and 
release before a notary in the state of Utah. The mother 
had initially contacted the adoption agency in the state of 
Utah while living with her sister concerning the adoption of 
the baby. This does not show the plaintiff agency as one 
who "shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into 
any other party state . . . as a preliminary to a possible 
adoption . . .." Id. 
Although the plaintiff agency provided the plane ticket 
for the mother to fly to Utah, this was not the cause of her 
placing the child for adoption in Utah. It was the mother's 
own decision. The plane ticket only served to facilitate 
her travel to Utah. The motherfs intention was to travel 
from California to Utah for the purpose of delivering the 
baby and placing it up for adoption with plaintiff. The 
airline ticket was only to assist the mother in carrying out 
her plans. To accept defendant's contention, that the 
airline ticket: caused the mother to give the child up for 
adoption in Utah, is to construe her intent to give up the 
child solely because of the plane ticket. This is simply 
not the case. The mother had decided to place the child for 
adoption long before a plane ticket was purchased. 
The plaintiff's agent had consulted with the Utah 
agency and officer that administers the Interstate Compact 
and was advised that it would not apply in this case. (Tr. 
2 of 3, pp. 251 - 252). If there was any attempt to hide 
this adoption from the Nevada authorities, the plaintiff 
would not have requested that the Nevada Welfare Department 
assist in securing defendant's signature on his second 
release. (Tr. 2 of 3, p. 130, p. 262). Finally, if Nevada 
had any question about the applicability of the Interstate 
Compact, they could have raise it when the Nevada Welfare 
Department and Margauerite Williams were asked to assist. 
(Tr. 2 of 3, pp. 130 et seq) There was no question raised 
by the Nevada authorities. 
Even if the plane ticket was the cause of the mother 
placing the child for adoption in Utah, the mother was not 
"sent" or "brought into any other party state" but arrived 
in the sending agency state. Therefore, the section does 
not apply. 
O A 
If the court does find that the Interstate Compact on 
Placement of Children does apply, it would not make any 
difference in this case. Failure to comply with that 
Compact would not prevent or invalidate the adoption. Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-4-301, Art. IV, (1953 as amended). 
Defendant would not necessarily have been put on notice (as 
if this would have mattered), since he did not attempt to 
comply with the Nevada requirement until after the adoption 
had taken place. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-301 (1953 as 
amended) Moreover, since the Compact specifically calls for 
the application of Utah law to the adoption, Utah Code 
Annotated § 62A-4-301 (1953 as amended), the defendant would 
be "out of luck" because he did not comply with Utah law. 
The only benefits (Appellant's Brief, p. 36) that the 
defendant claims he might have received had the plaintiff 
been required to and had followed the Interstate Compact is 
that it might have meant a little more time for him to have 
asserted his claim of paternity, and the plaintiff and 
D.R.F. would not have been able to avoid dealing with him. 
Neither of those claimed "benefits" in any way changes the 
outcome of this case. 
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PART TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
AWARD COURT COSTS TO 
THE PREVAILING PLAINTIFF 
The trial court erred in not taxing costs against the 
defendant. Except as otherwise provided in statute or 
rules, Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires costs to the prevailing party "unless the court 
otherwise directs." The trial court's ruling on whether to 
award costs will not be disturbed unless it is shown to be 
arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion. 
First Security Bank v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 
1974) . The trial court abused its discretion in not taxing 
costs. The trial courtfs decision was also arbitrary in not 
providing any reasons or support for its denial of costs. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
TAXING COSTS. 
Plaintiff has incurred costs in the amount of one 
thousand one hundred fifty-five and three-quarters dollars 
($1,155.75). This sum includes the seventy-five dollars 
($75) incurred for the filing fee, and the one thousand 
eighty and three-quarters dollars ($1,080.75) incurred for 
two depositions: (1) for the defendant in two sessions, and 
(2) "D.R.F," the mother of the child. These costs were 
reasonable and necessarily incurred. 
A, Filing Fee. 
The cost of filing the action is a legitimate cost that 
may be taxed against the defendant. Although the court in 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), generally 
limits cost awards to those provided in statute or rule, the 
court will allow additional costs not provided in statute in 
the reasonable discretion of the trial court. Id., at 
773-774. Courts traditionally have taxed costs for depo-
sitions (See infra part B) and filing fees (Evans v. 
Tennessee Department of Corrections, 514 F.2d 283, 284 (6th 
Cir. 1975)(where federal rule 54(d), the same as Utah's, 
includes filing fees as costs); Dunton v. Kibler, 518 
F.Supp. 1146, 1156 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
In defining "costs" under Rule 54(d), the Frampton 
court states: ,fthe generally accepted rule is that it 
["costs"] means those fees which are required to be paid to 
the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes 
authorize to be included in the judgment." Id. at 774 
(emphasis added). A filing fee is required to be paid to 
the court upon filing a lawsuit. It is therefore an appro-
priate cost to be taxed against the defendant upon plaintiff 
prevailing in the lawsuit. 
The court, in not taxing costs, abused its discretion. 
Such a reasonable and necessary cost could not be denied 
without an abuse of discretion. 
B. Depositions. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing 
plaintiff's costs of the depositions to be taxed against the 
defendant. In Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court, per Chief 
Justice Crocket, states: 
[A] majority of this Court has approved the taxing 
as costs the taking of depositions, but subject to 
the limitation that the trial court is persuaded 
that they were taken in good faith and, in light 
of the circumstances, appears to be essential for 
the development and presentation of the case. 
Id. at 774. 
The trial court never indicated if plaintiff lacked either. 
The trial court must be persuaded that the costs of the 
depositions were reasonable and necessary. Highland Const. 
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984). 
A court does not err in not awarding costs when the deposi-
tion is not used at trial and plaintiff presents no evidence 
that the costs were necessarily incurred for the preparation 
of the case. Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601, 604 (Utah 
1978). Plaintiff herein did use the depositions at trial. 
Also, plaintiff provided evidence that these expenses were 
necessary. The evidence that the costs of the depositions 
were necessarily incurred is manifest. 
In Lawson Supply Co. v. General Plumbing & Heat., Inc., 
493 P.2d 607 (Utah 1972) the trial court impliedly found the 
deposition of defendants were costs that were reasonably 
necessary to protect plaintiff's rights. These depositions 
were used to aid in a "theory11 in the case that was disputed 
and of great significance. 
In the instant case, the deposition of defendant and of 
the biological mother were reasonable and necessary for 
plaintiff's case. This case was on the "fast track11 and was 
granted a priority trial setting because of the nature of 
the dispute. Defendant's story had been subject to change 
and plaintiff's counsel wanted to establish defendant's 
testimony under oath so as to reduce the risk of defendant 
changing his story at trial and also to impeach him. This 
was the same motivation for taking "D.R.F's" deposition. 
Plaintiff's counsel used defendant's deposition at 
least (28) twenty-eight times at trial. Counsel used the 
deposition to refresh defendant's memory (Tr. part II, line 
22, p. 166) and to impeach his testimony on hotly contested 
issues of fact that went to the heart of the controversy 
(Tr. part II, line 20, p. 183). Plaintiff's counsel also 
used the deposition of "D.R.F" to refresh her memory and 
impeach her testimony at trial (Tr. part I, line 15, p. 85). 
Counsel used the depositions at least twelve (12) times 
during trial on issues of great importance. Such frequent 
use of the depositions at trial is prima facie evidence of 
their necessity. In denying costs, the trial court made no 
finding with regard to the need or lack of need for the 
depositions. 
When a deposition is used at trial on cross ex-
amination, both to impeach and refresh memory, and in-
troduced into evidence, such use is reasonable and neces-
sary. Highland Const. 683 P.2d at 1051; Frampton, 605 P.2d 
at 774 (costs of depositions are properly taxed "which 
relate to the examination of witnesses whose testimony is 
deemed essential to the trial, and taken for potential use 
at testimony in the trial11) ; 20 Am. Jur.2d § 58 (1969). The 
depositions were not used solely as an aid in discovery, 
plaintiff wanted to "pin11 the defendant down. In addition, 
plaintiff could not reasonably obtain this information 
through any other means. See Highland Const. 683 P.2d at 
1051-1052 (where plaintiff could not reasonably obtain 
information from other sources, needed to flpinM the witness-
es down to a specific theory, and use of deposition at trial 
all amounted to a reasonable and necessary cost incurred). 
Interrogatories or requests for admission could not be used 
in this case. These discovery methods were not available 
and could not be used effectively because of the expedited 
trial setting in this case. The court abused its discretion 
in not awarding these costs. 
Courts that have denied deposition costs have looked at 
whether the deposition was actually used at trial. Lloyd* s 
Unlimited v. Nature1s Way, 753 P.2d 507 (Utah App. 1988). 
Courts have also denied costs for items such as subpoenas, 
Lloyd's Unlimited, 753 P.2d at 512; expert witness' fees in 
excess of statutory mandate, Frampton, 605 P.2d at 773-774, 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988); Hatanaka 
v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah App. 1987). The Utah Supreme 
Court denied the costs of taking depositions of party 
opponents in John Price Associates, Inc. v. Davis, 588 P.2d 
713 (Utah 1978). Although the facts of John Price are 
unclear, the depositions of defendants were not very impor-
tant to the case so that "reasonable minds could differ11 as 
to their necessity and use. In contrast, the depositions 
herein of the defendant and ffD.R.F.M were very important and 
essential and "reasonable minds" could not differ as to 
their necessity and use. The appellate court, therefore, 
should overturn the trial court's decision denying costs to 
plaintiff. 
The court in Frampton draws a distinction between 
legitimate costs that may be taxed as costs and expenses of 
litigation that may be ever so necessary but are not proper-
ly taxable as costs. Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. This 
distinction refers to an expense that a statute allows to be 
taxed as costs, but is in excess of the statutory limit. 
Id. In Frampton, the court analyzed expert witness, subpoe-
na fees, and depositions. The standard used for depositions 
Li 
is "reasonably and necessary." Id.. As shown above, these 
costs were reasonable and necessary. Since the court has 
previously allowed the taxing of costs for depositions and 
expressly provides for cost of the court, what plaintiff 
asks for are legitimate taxable costs. Because the trial 
court denied to tax costs here, its decision was an abuse of 
discretion. When ff[n]o question was made as to the good 
faith of . . . [plaintiff] incurring these costs and they 
appear to be reasonable. They should have been allowed as a 
matter of course." Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of 
Ogden, 364 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1961). 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY DENIED COSTS. 
Even if the trial court did deny plaintiff's costs for 
an appropriate reason, the court should have articulated its 
reason for doing so. 
A court's exercise of discretion is arbitrary if the 
court does not supply any reasons for its decision. If the 
court denies the taxing of costs, it must supply some basis 
or reasoning for such denial. 
In addition, the case law provides that no decision of 
the trial court will be disturbed unless it is arbitrary or 
an abuse of discretion. See supra. This mandate implies 
that the trial court must supply some basis for its ruling. 
It is impossible to determine if a decision is arbitrary if 
A O 
no reasons are given for the decision and as herein the 
court denies costs completely. The majority of cases in 
this area reported on appeal deal with taxing of costs that 
are too high. The trial court does not need to articulate 
any reasons in those cases because it has taxed the costs. 
An explanation is only needed from the party complaining 
that such costs are too high. 
Two cases that treat the complete denial of costs, 
Nelson and Lloyd1s, each find that plaintiff has not met the 
burden of proving the costs were reasonable and necessary. 
The instant case differs substantially from Nelson and 
Lloyd's as the factors of reasonableness and necessity are 
manifest. Given that plaintiff met its burden, the 
responsibility would shift, then, to the trial court to 
articulate reasons why these costs should be denied. Denial 
of costs without out any explanation must be presumed arbi-
trary. 
Because the court declined to tax as costs the 
reasonable and necessary expenses of depositions and filing 
fee to a prevailing party, the trial court abused its 
discretion. In addition, because the trial court failed to 
articulate any reason for the denial of costs, the trial 
court's decision was arbitrary. The defendant should be 
taxed the costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court as to the termination 
of the defendant's parental rights should be affirmed and 
the adoption of the child should be allowed to proceed. 
The decision of the trial court refusing to award the 
plaintiff, as the prevailing party, its court courts should 
be reversed and the matter remanded with an order to enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for said costs. 
DATED this 24th day of August, 1989. 
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